

Zapovedan pedagog

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THE CONSCIOUS ACTION  
its ORIGIN  
and  
its BRAIN ORGANISATION.

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The Origin and Brain Organization of the Man's  
Conscious Action

The Origin and Cerebral Organization of the Content  
of Human Behavior

## I. The problem

Several years ago one of the most brilliant psychologists of our days B.F. Skinner, <sup>and after him D.O. Donald Hebb</sup> proposed to de-code the well known <sup>team</sup> CNS ~~for control~~ <sup>outstanding</sup> ~~two~~ ~~Nervous System~~, as "Conceptual Nervous System". That was ~~firstly~~ used as a ~~joke~~, but we can earnestly accept it: ~~The Human Brain~~ certainly is a device for re-organization of sensory input in a system of concepts, and ~~so~~ <sup>is</sup> ~~itself~~ a means for transferring human behavior from ~~a~~ to a higher level of self regulation.

[We choose for the topic of our lecture highest forms of conscious action, its origin and its brain mechanisms, and this new de-coding of the old term is of a special significance.]

: Conceptual Nervous System does not only de-code the sensual information we obtain; it is responsible for in making it free from ~~unpleasant~~ impressions, in establishing plans and programs and in controlling human behavior. It makes the man's brain an organ of freedom, - and it would be unwise to ignore that fundamental quality and to approach the ~~the~~ ~~to~~ Man's CNS with the same ideas, as the brain of a sat.

Now an important question arises: how can we find proper ways of a scientific interpretation of these qualities, not repeating the mistakes of the classical mentalism and not continuing the old ways of a mechanistic approach so modern two a generation ago and so discredited now? How can we provide an objective and scientific solution of the old riddle of the free activity of conscious behavior?

The proper way to a solution of this problem doesn't lay in the field of purely biological speculations; nor does it lay in the well known attempt to find the ~~route to~~ <sup>repeatedly</sup> of consciousness, conduct and freedom in the depths of a single nervous neuron with its synapses. To find this way one has to leave the purely biological field, and to go outside of the organism and to shift the attention to the analysis of the concrete relation of the growing subject to the concrete historically <sup>colonizing</sup> environment, which can be the only instance responsible for the origin of human cognition and free action.

That way the way started by L.S. Vygotski, the famous Russian psychologist, <sup>in the late</sup> and we shall make our best to follow this way.

A newborn comes in the world with a series of self-regulating activities, but these activities are of an elementary level - breathing and sucking, primitive orienting reflexes and a so battery of motor reactions the child which appear when the small child ~~is to~~ mother takes the child in her hands. All these forms of activities were carefully studied by a series of eminent scholars, and I can only mention such names as Minkowsky in Switzerland, Schlovanow in USSR, Peiper in Germany and recently that of my friend Jerome Bruner in USA. But how far are their findings from the really conscious self-regulating forms of the conduct of a school boy or of an adult!.

Where have we to seek routes of this highest forms of voluntary regulation of behavior?

The newborn starts his life in a milieu of adults. The mother speech does not only help him in his every step; she <sup>is</sup> permanently in a verbal contact with him: She shows him a ball and saying: "that's a ball", and the child turns its eyes towards the object and ~~then~~ tries to grasp it with his hands. His ~~volunt~~ conscious actions are divided between two persons: they start with his mother's speech and they end with his own actions. That is the origin of his ~~late~~ following self-sustained forms of activity, and after a short period of several months the child begins to say "a ball" and to ~~try to grasp it~~ thus making important alterations in the outer field - and tries to grasp it. The function formerly divided between the adult and a child becomes now an organization of a self-sustaining ~~inner~~ <sup>type</sup> psychological process. That is the origin of a new ~~level~~ <sup>type</sup> of behavior - social by origin, mediated by structure and self directed by function. We are approaching to a new level of problems - that of the free conscious ~~but~~ human behavior.

## 2. The earliest stages

However it would be unwise to suppose this mastering of this highest form of conscious action is a simple process and that the evolution of this level of behavior achieves its final forms in the early, pre-school age. As a matter of fact this is only the start, but is no means the end of the development of the man's higher psychological functions, and we have to <sup>follow up the</sup> pass an exciting and dramatic history of the evolution of these basic forms of ~~basic~~ behavior. Let us turn to some simple experiments and to try to show on simple models the basic steps of this complex process.

It is well known that an adult's verbal order can evoke in a child of

6-8  
8-12 months an organized orienting reaction and in a child of 12-14 months even a simple motor action. Name an object which lies in the immediate field of the child's sight - and he will turn his eyes towards the object and grasp it; tell say him: "lift your hands" and he certainly will do it.

It is obvious that the verbal instruction can start the child's action; but at this stage it is still unable to overcome the influence of an immediate impression, to stop an action the child starts or to stop replace a certain action to a different one. The more it is impossible to form use a verbal instruction for a construction of a system of inner codes which can form an inner field decisive for the control of the child's further actions.

Let us place <sup>in front of</sup> the child a small plush rabbit, and after he has come habituated to this object let us say to the child: "give me the rabbit!". The child will look in the direction of the toy and take it in his hands.

Let us now change the situation, and place <sup>in front of</sup> near the child two objects: the same rabbit and a new hen. Now our first verbal instruction: "give me the rabbit" can fail: the eyes of the child turn towards the rabbit, but they encounter meet the new hen, the hands, <sup>temporarily</sup> to this new toy, and he grasps <sup>immediately</sup> this new hen, following his <sup>new impression</sup> while orienting reflex which blocks the influence of the verbal instruction.

The same ~~can be observed if we try the verbal instruction to block the verbal instruction can be observed if we try to change an action which was previously established and which after some repetition became stiff stereotypes and to change it for another one.~~

To prove it we can repeat several times a verbal order: "give me the rabbit", and - without any change of voice change the order to the other one, saying now "give me the hen!". The inertia of formerly evoked action is at that stage so intensive that the change of a verbal instruction is unable to change the action and to overcome the formerly established stereotype (A.R. Luria & A.G. Poliakova, 1959a).

A second series of experiments can show that the verbal system receives its controlling functions only gradually.

Two well known objects are placed <sup>in front of</sup> before the child: a wooden cup on his right and a wooden ~~brick~~ cube on his left. The child observes that a penny is placed under the cup, and then he is ordered: "give me the penny!". ~~This~~ This order is easily fulfilled the child of 1;6 - 1;10 easily fulfills this command; some difficulties are seen if the realization of the command is postponed by 10 or 20 seconds; in this case the command can easily lose its regulatory

function and the child begins to observe both objects and only in a half of cases grasps the object named: the immediate orienting reaction overcomes the verbal command; only in children of 3;0 - 3;6 the delayed action becomes stable (A. A. Luria and A. G. Pol'yakova, 1959-6)

The unstability of the controlling function of the verbal command in small children can be seen in a last series of experiments, when the verbal instruction loses its immediate perceptual base.

The same two objects are placed in front of the child, but this time the penny is put under one of the objects when the child closes his eyes; then the verbal command is given: "The penny is under the cup; give me the penny!". In this cases the influence of the verbal instruction becomes less stable in younger children of 1;4 - 1;6 and insufficiently plastic in older children of 2;0 - 2;6. The first group of children do something fully ignore the instruction and try to grasp both objects (the second group) replacing a conscious action by an elementary orienting reaction; the second group start by fulfilling the command, but after 3-4 repetition of the same instruction - a new command: "The penny is under the ~~green~~ brick," "give me the penny" is given - the child ignores it and continues the former reaction. Only ~~close to the~~ their sensibility begins to disappear only in children of 3;0, and only at this period the verbal command begins to become sufficiently stable and independent from its visual base.

It is clear that at this early ages the verbal command can start an action but is unable to become stable and to overcome the immediate visual experience or the acquired motor habit.

### 3. Some experimental proofs.

The rule we mentioned can be easily shown by some simple experiments with the simple motor reaction.

Let us place in the hand of a child of 1;8 - 2;2 a rubber balloon connected with a pneumatic recorder and give him a command: "press the ball!". The results we shall observe will be not so simple as we could expect. If the holding of the balloon itself will not evoke some grasping reflexes - starts to press the balloon but is unable to stop this reaction, and a series of pressures will be recorded during a considerable time (Fig. 1). All efforts to stop these uncontrolled reactions became futile, and if we instruct the child to press only when he was told - don't result in an arrest of his movements and listening to the blocking instruction voice of the experimenter command - the child even increases his uncontrolled movements (Fig. 2). The verbal command which acquires its starting function pretty early has not yet acquired its blocking role.

The insufficiency of the controlling function of the verbal instruction

Fig. 1.

Fig. 2.

at that stage can be seen even more clearly distinctly in experiments with conditional form of verbal instruction.

The instruction : "When you see a light - you will press the ball" seems extremely simple; but as a matter of fact it requires a complicated algorithm of actions: a system of preliminary connections has to be established; the immediate orienting reaction towards the stimulus has to be blocked; the stimulus has to obtain a conditioned meaning, and a new conditional movement has to be started after the signal appears. This complicated system of conditions is impossible for a child of 2;0 - 2;6, and after he perceives the words, "when you see a light..." - he immediately begins to seek a light, stopping his movements, and when he hears the end of the instruction - "you will press the ball" - he ~~does it~~ starts the pressure independent from the signal. Thus - the instruction ~~leads to~~ <sup>leads to</sup> a paradoxical result: blocking the movements when the light appears and starting the new motor reaction when it is absent (Fig. 3). In this case the command <sup>weird</sup> ~~do press only~~ when you see the light "is of a little help, and it results even in a strengthening of the motor reaction or in a total arresting of the child's motor activity (Fig. 4).

Fig. 3.  
The selective influence of the verbal instruction is not yet ready in this period when the starting function of the verbal command is fully established.

The same can be observed even in older children of 2;8 - 3;0 if we complicate the instruction and if we try to establish a more complex program of future action, such as a choice reaction.

Fig. 4.  
Let us give to the child a command: "when you will hear a sound - press twice!" or: "when there will be a red light - you will press the ball; when you see a green one - you will do nothing!". In the such cases the child of 3;0 or even of 3;6 will easily perceive the verbal instruction but will be unable to follow this command, and in the first experiment will answer the sound by a series of uncontrolled motor reactions (Fig. 5), and in the second - will press after both - positive and negative signals (Fig. 6). To the task to follow the instruction and to build a stable program of actions according to a given rule - is impossible for the child of that age.

Fig. 5.  
Only by 3;6 - 4;0 the child becomes able to ~~not~~ follow so this complicated program, blocking the immediate influence of the signal, but even less a slight complication of the experiment results in a destruction of the first forms of child's organized behavior.

#### 4. Verbal control of the action.

Now we come to the question: is it possible to speed up this process of the natural growth development and to find means to improve the conscious control of the child's own actions even on its early stages of development?

All attempts we made to improve the child's own control of his behavior at the stage of 1;0 - 1;6 failed, and all methods except one we shall not mention here - remained futile. However some experiments with the children of 2;6 - 2;8 gave some results and enabled us to find some ways for the solution of our problems.

~~At this stage of development we were still unable to organize the child's complicated reactions by means of our verbal instructions; the child was not yet able to use his own speech for the control of his own behavior; but he could come to a good regulation of his reaction ~~area~~ motor behavior if the child's motor reactions ~~were~~ evoked a signal feed-back signal. So, if we instructed the child to press the balloon and thus, to put out the light" step by additional pressures disappeared (Fig. 7). The same result could be observed if the child who fulfilled the instruction: "If you will see a light - press twice" resulted in a feed-back signal - for example a click. (Fig. 8)~~

Thus, at this stage, a verbal instruction was able to evoke an organized action and to block superfluous reactions only if the whole process was constructed <sup>according</sup> on a scheme of a feed-back system, otherwise if every reaction of the child resulted in reinforcing or a "sanctioning" afferentation feed-back afferentation.

Now a question arises: couldn't we replace this feed-back afferentation, which blocks the child's excessive movements by a higher and more specific verbal activity by of the child and to turn to the child's own speech verbal commands as a means for a control of his behavior?

Our first experiments with children of 2;4 - 2;8 gave negative results. A child of 2;4 - 2;8 - could easily answer to each stimulus ~~is~~ with a simple verbal reaction "go!" ; but if we instructed him to answer every signal with a simple motor reaction, pressing the balloon and simultaneously by pronouncing the word "go!", we could see that the verbal reaction did block every motor reaction, and no controlling influence of the verbal child's verbal command was possible (Fig. 9).

Different results were obtained when we turned with the same experiments to the children of 3;4 - 3;8 : introduction of the child's

Fig. 7

Fig. 8

Fig. 9.

own verbal commands „go!“ to didn't result in any success on the first stages of the experiment, but after a certain training became able to control his motor activity, and giving himself verbal commands „go!“, „go!“ - he began to give organized motor reactions, blocking his successive excessive movements; the elimination of such verbal auto-command resulted in re-appearance of such disorganized motor reactions (Fig. 10). The verbal system which acquired at this stage a more concentrated neurodynamic function - began to be able to control the motor activity of the child.

Fig. 10.

The same results could be seen if we included the child's own verbal commands in a more complex task, asking the child to press twice to each signal, saying a double command: „go! go!“ (Fig. 11).

Fig. 11.

In all these cases the verbal system of the child which was now based on a more concentrated neurodynamic processes, acquired here a raw controlling function, and it was the first time we could observe the appearance of the most simple and overt form of what Pavlov called "the highest regulators of the human behavior".

It would be however erroneous to think that the data we have mentioned signify a full that the "conceptual nervous system" is already ready in its controlling function of the. All we have described is only the start of its regulatory role in the conscious action.

To prove that we had to make our experiments a little more complicated and from simple motor reaction pass to the reaction of choice. Here the psychological structure of the behavioral control changes totally: one - positive signal (e.g. red light) has to evoke a motor reaction, and the other - positive signal as well (e.g. green light) has to block it. The same remains if we turn towards the child's own verbal signals, which was of a considerable help in simple reactions. Now - the positive verbal command „go!“ has to start the motor reaction while another verbal command - with the same positive innervation "no!" - a characteristic "no!" - has a negative semantic contents and has to block it. Their conflict between an immediate positive and semantic blocking significance brings significant difficulties for the child; the immediate excitatory influence of the signal becomes a stronger influence than its negative meaning, and saying to the green light, the verbal command „no!“ does not block, but even does distract the children child's motor reaction (Fig. 12). The same can be seen even in a more grotesque form in ~~in~~ an imbecil child, where the immediate influence of an immediate process discharge ~~is~~ of the verbal reaction „no!“

Fig. 12.

Fig. 13.

results even in an intensification of his motor response (Fig. 13)

Only all this changes only by 4;6 - 5;0 years, when the establishing of inner programs of complex actions becomes ready and when every the external help of ~~etc~~ the child's own <sup>loud</sup> verbal command becomes useless. At this stage the semantic organization of the internal fields can become dominant and a plan formed by the adult instruction can receive an ultimate controlling role. That is why a child of 4;6 - 5;0 can becomes able to fulfill the adult's instruction without any help of its own <sup>loud</sup> reinforcement, - and this stage may be considered as a real consolidation of the controlling function of the "Conceptual Nervous System" we mentioned in the very beginning of this paper.

### S. Some considerations about the <sup>the</sup> present organization of "CNS".

We shall stop for a while over <sup>further</sup> analysis of the further development of the highest form of the conscious control of actions; it intimately depends on the further formation of conceptual coding of external impressions and the formation of ~~inner speech~~ the child's inner speech. L.S. Vygotski and J. Piaget have contributed to the analysis of this process so much that any attempt to add some significant data would be only superfluous.

Let us turn now to the second problem of our discussion : what could be the cerebral organization responsible for the control of the man's own behavior? The idea of the "Conceptual Nervous System" gives us only some general frames for the understanding of this highest level of ~~the~~ <sup>of behavior</sup> organization, But it does not yet describe the concrete structure and the mode of its mechanism. The work of this complicated mechanism

Which are the systems of the human brain which ~~control the best behavior~~ can form our plans and the real programs of our actions, provide a stable and selective attention, and control the effective outcomes of our actions and block all diversions from these plans, ~~thus resulting in errors or mistakes?~~ Which are the mechanisms of such control of behavior?

In our approach <sup>to</sup> this problem we don't lose the sense of reality, and we know all right that all we can say will be only a first step approach to this basic question. But nearly forty years of ~~our work in~~ <sup>discussion of</sup> an analysis of focal brain lesions gave us an opportunity to collect a series of facts, which we shall try only to bring them in a system in order rather to construct ~~a~~ an clear and ultimate theory.

To say that the "Conceptual Nervous System" works as a ~~it~~ whole means to say make a correct and at the same time an erroneous statement.

It is true because ~~this is their most complex & kind of activity can be based only on the~~ <sup>such comp.</sup> ~~to human actions~~ The most complex forms of the human actions we discuss can be based only require the activity of all ~~cerebral systems~~ <sup>in human actions</sup> systems of the brain - this higher highpoint of evolution; it is false because we hardly can suppose the Human Brain works as an undifferentiated whole and that its work depends only on the mass active mass of its excited tissue.

Modern data of Brain morphology, physiology and clinical observations made it impossible to stick <sup>coherence</sup> on the idea of the Brain as a <sup>unorganized</sup> whole, which was possible a generation ago, but which is intenable now. But <sup>in fact that</sup> we refuse to sustain the idea of a Brain holism does not mean we return to the old concepts of isolated nervous areas responsible for complex cerebral psychobiological processes. The ideas of Gall and Kleist ~~as~~ are as far from us as the ideas of Bally and Lashley.

Now we have all grounds to understand the Human Brain including its cortex - as a complex functional system, which includes a joint work of different levels and areas, each of which <sup>plays</sup> ~~enters~~ in this system ~~on~~ its own role. The concept of "working constellations" of A.A. Levitanski, of "functional mosaics" of Pavlov or of "cell assemblies" of D.O. Hebb received in the latest time a much more definite meaning than they had before. We have not to forget that the scholars trying to solve the riddle of the Human Brain are digging the tunnel from both sides, and the achievements of the modern work on single neurons we can only admit come in a close harmony with the modern studies of the functional architecture of jointly working levels of the ~~but~~ interrelations of the Human Stem and the cortical formations of the Human Brain.

What can we await from these branches of the Neuroscience if we shall try to investigate ~~#~~ our main basic problem - that of the Brain structures responsible for the organization of the conscious action?

Data collected during the last few decades give all grounds to <sup>single out</sup> ~~divide~~ at least three basic blocks which take part in the common work of the Human Brain, each of them - on ~~on~~ <sup>making</sup> its own contribution to this work.

The first block may be called the block of Energy or Tone; it includes Hypothalamus, the formations of the upper brain stem, the reticular formations and to a certain degree the ancient parts of the mesial limbic cortex and hippocampus. It is responsible for a stable tone of the cortex and that state of vigilance which the psychiatrists erroneously call consciousness. It would be at least unwise to discuss the activities of this block in

details : the well known brilliant works of Magoun and Moruzzi, Jasper and Lindsley and last but not least of Olds and McLean make it unnecessary and the ~~discoveries~~ <sup>discoveries</sup> and the ~~descriptive~~ <sup>descriptive</sup> contribution of these authors to the theory of sleep and wakefulness, arousal and drives have to be considered as the most significant contributions of our science.

We have to take in account the role this block plays in the activity of the "Conceptual Nervous System"; but it would be a fatal error to ~~that~~ suppose that it in providing the general vigilance of the cortex it can be regarded as an organ of the man's conscious activity.

As it was shown by a group of outstanding scholars this block contains a considerable amount of unspecific neurons which Jasper called "attention units" and ~~different~~ <sup>other</sup> authors and which serve as important devices for supporting the wakefulness of the cortex.

Observations we could make during the last years on a series of fits, tics and aneurisms of the medial parts of the brain hemispheres gave us every reason to suppose that these deep lesions of the brain disturb general wakefulness of the subject, result in a loss of selectivity of his stream of thought, lead to a marked derangement of the short term memory (A.R. Liessa, E.D. Temskaya, S.M. Beirokou & M. Critchley, 1967, A.R. Liessa, A.Ya. Podgornaya, A.N. Konovalev, 1969, A.R. Liessa, N.K. Ryiaschenko, unpublished) - but they never result in a stable disturbance of the system of concepts neither in a loss of a voluntary regulation of human actions. It is obvious that a small reinforcement can result in these cases in an increase of active state of the cortex and thus in a certain compensation of the defects observed (E.D. Temskaya, 1969). All that means that the interactors of the first block is of course one of important conditions of the higher forms of behavioral control, but that we have no grounds to consider this block as its specific device of this regulation.

The second block of the Brain includes posterior parts of the hemispheres with occipital, parietal and temporal regions and their conductive parts; it can be designated as a block of input, elaboration, re-coding and preservation of the information from the external world. I had many occasions to discuss the problems of its functions in a series of books (A.R. Liessa, 1967, 1968, 1969) and I shall dwell on its activities only shortly.

It is well known that the systems included in that block are ~~not~~ highly modality-specific : the occipital lobe does not take part in elaboration of acoustic signals (being a central apparatus of visual analysis) and the temporal lobe participates only to a limited degree in the elaboration of acoustic information. It is also known as well that each system of this block has a

Hierarchical structure and that every primary (or extrinsic) zone is followed by a <sup>superimposed</sup> secondary (intrinsic) zone which ~~is superimposed~~ imposed has a highly developed second and third layer of so-called associative neurones and which enables to elaborate the immediate somato-topic signals in a functionally organized dynamic structures.

A series of very important studies conducted during the last years on neuronal level showed that only a minority of the neurones of these zones have areas of a non-specific type etc. while the major part have a highly specific function ~~answering~~ <sup>answering</sup> to single or combined influence of modality-specific receptors.

The specificity of these areas decreases ~~with~~ with the transition to the <sup>which</sup> a Tertiary "zones" or the "overlapping areas" which include elements of ~~of~~ different modalities and which provide a multi-modal simultaneous synthesis of successively series of signals. An important role played by this area in elaboration of the highest logical specific and conceptual structures is now well known (Cf. A.R. Luria, 1946, 1962, 1963 etc.)

We had shown that in a series of publication where we tried to analyse disturbances of perception psychological operations included in perception and action, speech and thought in lesions of these parts of the brain (Cf. A.R. Luria, 1962, 1963, 1966 etc.) and to discuss some ways of recovery of disturbed functions in these cases (Cf. A.R. Luria, 1948, 1963 etc.)

One typical basic feature has to be mentioned in these cases: patients with lesions of the posterior parts of the brain can lose some important operations - but they never lose their conscious actions forms of activity; they are aware of their defects, they can retain their plans and programs, they preserve their strategy, they are fully aware of their defects and as a rule they can work very actively to overcome their deficits. They are human beings with tragic fate but they remain human beings in the full measure of this word. One can never speak here about any loss of the control of their conscious action.

Thus - we come to the conclusion that the second block takes an important part in the construction of the "Conceptual Nervous System", but it is in no way responsible for a regulation and control of <sup>human</sup> ~~conscious~~ actions activity.

The third block includes the frontal lobes of the brain, and

its functions ~~are~~ have an immediate relation to the main problem of our discussion.

The Frontal lobes of the brain occupy nearly a third of the human hemispheres, <sup>and</sup> they are the last acquisition of the evolution. They preserve a typical vertically organized structure relating them to the motor cortex (G.J. Poliakov, 19<sup>th</sup> century), and their prefrontal parts have one of the same type as all other tertiary zones. They have an intimate relation to the reticular formation <sup>including</sup> having a dense system of ascending and descending fibres and serve as an important structure superimposed on to the systems of the higher brain stem (Oppen, 1955, Hayya, 1964, 1968 etc.); thus they can be considered as a system which plays an important role in regulation of the apparatuses of the first block. They have intimate connections to all parts of the posterior and motor cortex, but unlike the ~~so~~ high specificity of the second block its work has no more modality specific.

There are ~~great~~ many reasons to suppose that these parts of the brain play an important role in establishing plans and programs of human actions and in regulating and control of human behavior.

We discussed the problems of the functions of the frontal lobes in a series of publications (cf. A.R. Luria 1962, 1963, 1966, A.R. Luria and E.D. Leonstaya, 1966 etc.), but here we have to resume ~~the~~ our findings and to discuss once more the role this part of the brain plays in the control of human conscious action.

### Disturbances of behavior in lesions of the frontal lobes

#### 6. Disturbances of Behavior in lesions of the frontal lobes.

The Neurological Clinic knows very well the general disturbances of behavior following severe lesions of the frontal lobes (limited lesions can remain symptomless because of the high capacity of ~~balance~~ substitution of the tissues of this "latest and less differentiated" parts of the human brain", as Hugueney Jackson formulated of the Frontal lobes).

Patients with massive lesions of the frontal lobes don't exhibit as a rule stable alteration of the cognitive tone nor marked disturbances in orientation in space and time typical for patients with lesions of the mental parts of the hemispheres. They don't suffer any defects in perception or simple action, speech or formal logical operations. At a first glance one can suppose

that they preserve all basic functions of the "Conceptual Nervous System".

But that is not the case, and a thorough observation can show how deep is disturbed the regulation and control of the conscious actions of these patients.

As a rule - only a limited part of these patients is able to formulate plans or to follow programs; neither do they show any complicated motives or higher level conscious drives. No strategy can be observed in their behavior and they do not try to find proper means for realize their conduct. They do not show any future-linked outlooks which are decisive in the behavior of a normal ~~sub~~ subject. Realisation of given plans or programs is easily replaced in these patients with primitive "field-actions", impulsive responses to immediate impressions or with inert reproductions of former stereotypes which formerly was had a sense but in new conditions became totally senseless. The ~~we~~ classical observations of S.). Franz and Bianchi, ~~and~~ Belitser, ~~and~~ Pavlov and Anokhin to animals with resection of the frontal lobes became many times enriched in observation on patients with massive lesions of the frontal lobes. We cannot forget a woman of a high culture with a massive bilateral tumor of the frontal lobes who ~~started~~ <sup>newly</sup> in the first early period of her disease began to ~~clean~~ the evening <sup>newly</sup> using a broom, and who ~~had~~ tried to cook ~~a~~ <sup>the</sup> noodle party in the sausages pieces of meat. We cannot forget a soldier with a massive gunshot wound in frontal lobes who was instructed to plant a plane and who <sup>gradually</sup> continued automatically his work till he planted a half of the ~~tree~~ <sup>tree</sup>.

It is easy to see that the regulatory influences of the inner plans and programs - otherwise of the "Conceptual Nervous System" became severely deranged, ~~and are~~ in this case, the whole organization of behavior is switched on a lower level and is replaced by uncontrolled reactions to immediate impressions or by uncontrolled repetition of former stereotypes.

The decisive role of the frontal lobes in the control of conscious actions is out of question. But the problem remains: what are the causes of such a role of the Frontal Lobes?

#### 7. Frontal lobes and the regulation of active states

Let us turn to some experimental data which could ~~be of~~ a considerable help <sup>to</sup> answer this question.

To fulfill a complicated program of behavior one has to preserve

a certain level of vigilance; but a general active state of the cortex provided by the higher stem and reticular formation is in no case sufficient for a selective and programmed behavior. The kind of activity needed for realization of complicated programs has to have a strictly selective type evoked by the goal or by a problem given to the subject; a part of information, ~~several~~ having immediate relation to the problem has to become dominant and / or become dominant while every influence distracting from the goal has to be suppressed. It is obviously that such an organization of the active states can be provided only with close participation of the cortical areas and their descending pathways.

The Frontal lobes - and especially their mesial parts - are exceptionally rich with descending connections with the reticular formation; this was shown by a series of works of French (1955), Naute (1964, 1968), Zager (1962) and others. That is why in case a goal or a plan the subject formulates result in a rise of his active state - it can be only confirm our assumption on the role of the frontal lobes in the process of activation.

This assumption is well supported by a series of different experiments made by Grey Walter in England and M. N. Livanov in the USSR.

As it is well known Grey Walter giving his subjects a problem to await for some signals could see ~~stop~~ the appearance of slow <sup>negative</sup> ~~contingency~~ waves in the frontal cortex, which then were spreading to other parts of the hemispheres; they clearly <sup>increased</sup> ~~augmented~~ when the subject's expectancy state of the subject increased became intensif and disappeared when the appearance of the stimulus became less probable or when the task of expectation was removed. Grey Walter (1963, 1966) had every reason to call them "expectancy waves".

At the same time M. N. Livanov in Moscow - after using the technique of 50-channel electrodes - made some important observation. When giving to a normal subject a difficult intellectual task, requiring a stable activation of efforts (such as multiplication of <sup>numbers</sup> by <sup>recursion</sup>) he observed an appearance of a significant number of synchronously working points in the frontal lobe cortex; this synchronous character of activity disappeared after the problem was solved or after the task was eliminated (Fig. 14). The same could be seen in recording brain potentials in an excited paranoid patients and the amount of <sup>patients'</sup> synchronous foci in frontal lobe decreased after a treatment with chlorpromazine (Fig. 15).

Fig. 14

Fig. 15

All that data make it very probable, that the frontal lobes of the brain take a considerable part in activating the brain when some difficult problems were given to the subject, and that the excitation originated in the region of the frontal lobes is spreading to the other parts of the cortex as well as to the underlying levels of the Nervous System, resulting in a regulation of the active states needed for this kind of actions.

If our assumption is right - we can find in patients with severe lesions of the frontal lobes clear defects alteration in any attempts to evoke selected activation of their most complicated forms, and especially any activation according to <sup>to the patient</sup> a verbal instruction, giving a certain goal or a certain problem.

That was just the question my collaborator Dr E. D. Konskaya tried to answer in her long series of studies using a battery of different approaches to one problem.

Let us mention only a some of her findings.

It is well known that an appearance of every stimulus result in a normal person in a series of vegetative reaction which can be evaluated as vegetative components of an orienting reflex (constriction of periphereal vessels simultaneously with a dilatation of the vessels of the head, & galvanic skin reactions etc.). These reactions can be traced for a period, and are extinguished after the subject is habituated to the stimuli and can become fixed if a special instruction (such as: "Count the stimuli" or "pay attention to any change of the stimuli" or "press the key when the stimulus appears" etc.) are given, in other words when a stimulus receives its "signalling meaning" (E. N. Sokolov, 195, O. S. Vinogradova, 195, J. Lindsay, 19 et al.) (Fig. 16).

Such exaggeration and fixation of vegetative symptoms of the orienting reflex is seen in patients with lesions of the posterior parts of the hemispheres; but it does not exist in patients with lesions of the frontal lobes and especially of its mesial or basal parts (Fig. 17); this symptom is of a high significance and sometimes remains the only symptom of the disturbance.

Similar data can be obtained by recording the EEG changes components of the orienting reactions.

It is well known that every new and unexpected stimulus result in a depression of the alpha diapason of the EEG and especially in depression of the higher frequencies of this diapason; it is known as well that a verbal instruction giving a signalling meaning to the stimulus makes this depression more marked and more stable (Fig. 18).

Fig. 16

Fig. 17

Fig. 18

The same is seen in patients with lesions of the posterior parts of the cortex, although the background of EEG can be considerably changed in these cases; no such effect is observed in patients with lesions of the frontal lobes and especially in patients with lesions of the meso-frontal parts. A verbal instruction to count the signals or to await their change does not alter the EEG waves or - in some cases - results in some depression of the lower frequencies or even in a paradoxical exaggeration of the electrical activity (Fig. 19)

Fig. 19.

During the last years we paid attention to a new EEG symptom of arousal which proved to be of a high reliability. As it was shown by A.A. Genkin (1962, 1963), and then by E.D. Homskaya and E.Ye. Artemieva (1966, 1967, 1969) a systematic examination of the EEG of the alpha-waves in a normal person shows a peculiar alteration of the relation of the ascending and descending fronts of the alpha-waves, with a rhythmic change of this <sup>asymmetry</sup> index <sup>regularly</sup> every 6-7 seconds; this is clearly observed in steady states of the subject and becomes broken when an activation or an intellectual arousal takes place (Fig. 20).

Fig. 20

The same can be seen in patients with lesions of the posterior parts of the brain, but it is not observed in patients with frontal lobe lesions. Here any activating instruction does not result in any change of the regular changes of the asymmetry index (Fig. 21)

Fig. 21

Perhaps the most important ~~are~~ is a series of data showing that the activation fields of cortical processes evoked by a verbal instruction are of a selective type and that this selectivity is lost in patients with lesions of the frontal lobes. That was shown by Dr E.G. Simeritkaya (1966, 1969) in her experiments with evoked potentials.

Fig. 22

It is well known that over each specific stimulus (visual or cutaneous) evokes specific potential changes in occipital or sensori-motor parts of the cortex, and that every expectation of such stimulus results in an exaggeration of its evoked potential (Fig. 22)

Fig. 23

The same effect of a verbal instruction to await the signal is seen in patients with lesions of the posterior parts of the cortex; but no such effects of verbal command is observed in patients with lesions of the frontal or meso-frontal parts of the brain (Fig. 23)

All these data obtained by Dr E.D. Homskaya and their co-workers show that the frontal lobes of the brain take part in the regulation of the active states of the brain, and that this influence comes from the influences of verbal instructions, which formulate a plan or a program evoking an active the subject's active effort. It is easy to see how important are these data for the understanding of

Some acts basic mechanisms of conscious actions.

### 8. Frontal lobes and the control of conscious actions.

Disturbances of the regulation of active states observed in patients with massive lesions of the frontal lobes have a far reaching result for the structure of man's purposeful actions. Being unable to sustain a selective state of attention, patients become unable to realize complicated programs of actions according the instruction given.

Let us turn to a series of experiments.

If a patient with severe lesion of the frontal lobes is asked to fulfill a simple action imitating the movement of the physician - no difficulties are seen: he lifts a fist when the physician is making the same movement and ~~not~~ lifts his finger when a finger is shown.

Let us now change the experiment and arrange it so that the verbal instruction comes in a conflict with the immediate perception of the physician's movement: let us instruct the patient: "When you see a fist - you will lift your fingers, - and when you see a finger - you'll lift the fist."

The realization of this instruction is now impossible, and even if the patient - who preserves the verbal instruction during the whole experiment - starts in & correct reactions, loses them after and after 2-3 trials begins to give imitative, echopractic reactions: the immediate perception of the experimenter's movements is now blocking the influence of the verbal instruction and the planned programmed reaction is substituted by an immediate one. The same can be observed if we ask the patient to react to every single knock with two knocks, and to every pair of knocks - with one knock. The reduction of a programmed action to an imitative one in both cases is obvious.

The breakdown of a programmed action ~~so soon~~ in patients with severe lesions of the frontal lobes can take on a different form and can be replaced by a primitive behavior directed by an inert stereotype. If we instruct the patient to lift his right hand in response to one knock, and the left hand in response to two knocks and ~~then~~ after repeating several times the same order of two signals will break this order (1-2-1-2-1-1), the patient who has already established a stereotype of alternated ~~two~~ reaction will continue that stereotype inspite of the changed order of signals, and no correction of this order will follow, although the contents of verbal reaction remains preserved. In cases of more severe lesions of the frontal lobes this inertia of nervous processes can be seen even in the

verbal level, and if the patient is instructed to realize a rhythmical program giving one strong and two slight knocks, repeating his own verbal commands: "Strong - slight - slight!" - the pathological inertia of his nervous processes result in a gradual augmentation of slight knocks, and the patient begins to alter his commands, saying: "Strong - slight - slight! Strong - slight - slight - slight... Strong - slight - slight - slight - slight..." realizing the most perseverative programs. (Fig. 24)

Both times the regulatory role of the "Conceptual Nervous System" is fundamentally deranged and the patient's behavior is shifted to a lower uncontrolled level.

A substitution of programmed action by primitive & instinctive or perseverative ~~ref~~ reactions can be seen in a series of very remarkable facts which are never encountered in less patients with lesions of the posterior parts of the brain.

It is well known that a realization of a very simple instruction - for example a drawing of a simple scheme is based on a complexed algorithm of actions: the subject has to draw one line, ~~then to block all~~ preserve the goal and to block any outside movement; drawing a component of the scheme he has to arrest this movement, shift his hand to another position, draw the next component etc.

Realization of such complicated algorithm of actions is impossible for a patient with a severe lesion of the frontal lobes, - and we can easily observe that the realization of a complicated meaningful program becomes easily replaced in these cases by a series of uncontrolled actions or unblocked excessive movements. We shall show that only on two examples

Fig. 25 A patient with ~~less~~ a traumatic cyst of the frontal lobe is instructed to draw a quadrangle. He begins to do it (Fig. 25), draws three quadrangles and then a large quadrangle following the borders of the sheet. During this action meanwhile the psychologist leading this experiment ~~says~~ whispers to his colleague: "Did you know about the pact signed to-day?" - and the That is enough to link the patient's further action and he writes ~~a~~ in the middle of a large quadrangle: "Act N....". "What is the patient's name?" - whispers the psychologist, - and the patient <sup>writing</sup> immediately "Yermolin". "Look, that is so similar to the behavior of animals after frontal destruction of the frontal lobes!" whispers the psychologist, - and the patient <sup>writes</sup> directly: "Concerning to the formerly work 'Act': , on Animal breeding..." We can hardly find an example which would better express the whole character of the patient's ~~conscious~~ uncontrolled

Fig. 24.

Fig. 25

actions..

Another example is seen at the same figure. A patient with a massive tumor of the left frontal lobe is asked to draw a triangle; & at once he draws it and ~~then~~ adds a second triangle to the first. He is asked to draw a minus. He draws a figure which being a kind of a minus preserve the closed structure of the former triangle. He is asked to draw a circle. He does it but ~~he~~ adds the same oblong figure in the middle of the circle. "Draw only a circle" says the command. The patient repeats the same drawing adding a subscription " Entrance strongly forbidden! Can you guess what was the patient's former profession?... In both cases a selective conscious actions is broken by some uncontrolled nonconscious associations; in the next case (fig. 26) the execution of a given program in a patient with a tumor bilateral tumor of the frontal lobes is broken by an instant perseveration of a former action.

Fig. 26  
We discussed all possible forms of the breakdown of the realization of given programs in patients with severe lesions of the frontal lobes elsewhere (cf R.R. Luria, 1962, 1963, 1966, 1969 and A.R. Luria and E.D. Homskaya, 1966) and shall not continue our example.

All we have observed during a long period give us all rights to believe that severe lesions of the frontal lobes result in a breakdown of the realization of behavioral programs given by verbal instructions, and that in these cases we are able to observe ~~at the~~ clear marked disturbances of the ~~systèmes~~ of a conscious control of human actions which becomes ready in children of 4-4;6 years old, when the ~~systems~~ of the frontal lobes become functionally ripe.

#### 9. Frontal lobes and the strategy of perceptive actions.

Up to now we have described the disturbances of the realization of action programs given to the patients with severe lesion of the frontal lobes. It is obvious that even more massive defects are seen in more complex forms of their behavior where patients have to choose their own plans of conduct and to construct their own programs. That can be easily seen in a series of experiments with complex perceptive actions requiring an active elaboration of the information given to the patient.

Several years ago E.N. Sokolov (1958) proposed a technique of investigation of such elaboration of perceptive programs

was followed by special experiments by L. Arana (1961) and O.K. Tikhomirov (1966). A subject is given a pattern of checkers consisting two one of the two possible letters - H and E or H and M, where only some decisive points give an information whether which letter is presented. The subject has to close his eyes and to touch successively the checkers with one finger. As it was observed a normal subject begins with an extended system of trials, but very soon restricts his trials and touches only the points which give a decisive information (Fig. 27).

Fig. 27.

No such process of preliminary search with a gradually refine variation of information is seen in patients with lesions of the frontal lobes. As a rule they begin with touching all successive checkers, but they don't even start any attempts to single out the decisive information nor to they abbreviate their activity. Their touching the checkers don't at all serve as a means for preliminary basis of their ultimate decision, and they come to a "conclusion" which has nothing to do with their preliminary activity (Fig. 28).

Fig. 28

It becomes clear that the structure of a complex action becomes totally changed in these patients and that the phase of preliminary exploratory investigating activities is totally excluded in patients with severe lesions of the frontal lobes, which we is never the case in the behavior of patients with lesions of the posterior parts of the brain.

This basic difference in behavior is clearly seen in experiments with observation of complex thematic pictures.

Let us present to a normal subject a complex thematic picture - such as a well known picture of the outstanding Russian painter J.E. Repin - "The Unexpected Return". Here we see a prisoner who returned home after many years he spent in a Czar's prison. Let us fasten to the sclera of the subject a little mirror, which reflects a beam of light to a ~~se~~ photo-sensitive paper, ~~moving~~ ~~with~~ recording the subject's eye movements (Yerbus, 1966, 1967). Let us now ask the subject different questions such as: "How old are the members of the family?", "How are they dressed?", "Are they poor or rich?" and last but not least: "How long <sup>was</sup> the prisoner kept imprisoned?". If a recording of the ocular movements during 3 minutes of observation can show us, how complex is the exploratory period of each observation and how profoundly this process changes in different instructions (Fig. 29).

Fig. 29

No such complicated structure of a perceptive action is seen in patients with severe lesions of the frontal lobes. The perceptual evaluation of a

Fig. 30

Theematic picture does not include any preliminary exploratory eye movements; the patient fixes some parts of the picture which are closer by chance and, his ocular movements preserve their chaotic or perseverative character (fig. 30) and the instruction given to the patients do not result in any change (fig. 30). It becomes obvious that the phase of preliminary experime exploratory phase ~~doesn't~~ <sup>nearly</sup> exist in the perceptive activity of these patients, and his evaluation of the picture becomes ~~accidental~~ <sup>nearly</sup> accidental character.

Here we have every ground to conclude that the concept of patients behavior becomes receives a much more primitive level and that no inner plans or programs are controlling his behavior.

After all we have said it becomes clear that the more complicated forms of intellectual activity is largely disturbed in patients with severe lesions of the frontal lobe, and that time - not ~~as it was supposed by K. Goldstein~~ because they lose their abstract concepts or logical operations, (the observation show they are preserved), but because the elaboration or re-coding of the information is here severely hampered and because the controlling function of the "Conceptual Nervous System" is no more included in the organization of their behavior.

I have discussed this problem in several special publications while analyzing the constructive activity of these patients and the characteristics of their problem solving behavior (cf A.R. Luria and G.D. Kornukova, 1966, A.R. Luria and L.S. Tsvetkova, 1967), and I shall not dwell further on these problems.

#### 10. Conclusions and outlook.

We have finished a review of some our data concerning the problem of the origin of conscious actions and their brain organization, and we can now turn to some general conclusions.

We can fully agree that the basic function of the "Conceptual Nervous System" is an elaboration of some inner codes which provide a general reflection of the external world, and make it possible to abstract our behavior from some accidental influence and to subordinate our actions to special plans and programs. ~~which are mostly formulated by the man's outer or inner speech~~. That really makes the human brain an organ of freedom.

We know as well that such a controlling function of the brain originates with the development of the pragmatic or ~~cont~~ regulatory function of speech, and that the source of this controlling function can be found not in the depths of the brain but in the some complicated relations of the child to its social environment and its acquisition of language.

We know finally that one of the important apparatuses of the control can be found in the Frontal Lobes of the Human Brain and their intimate relation with all the underlying brain stem structures, and that the Human Frontal Lobes play an important role in carrying out the most important cues of our programs of actions, blocking the outside <sup>noxious</sup> cues which can disturb the organized execution of these programs. The inner mechanisms of the role of the "Conceptual Nervous System" in the control of conscious actions becomes clearer than it was before.

But however - after a long work - we have to admit that we are only on the very first stages of our way, and that the amount of the ~~of~~ <sup>involved</sup> problems is many times ~~the~~ <sup>more</sup> than the ~~amount~~ <sup>number</sup> of questions we amount of our actual knowledge.

We don't yet know ~~what~~ <sup>intimate</sup> on the physiognostical mechanisms of the controlling activity of the Frontal Lobes nor the role of the Inner Speech in this control the control of our conscious actions. Our conception on the complicated functional organization of the frontal lobes remains too vague, and only during the last years we began to collect data of very different contributions of different parts of the frontal lobes to the organization of the Human behavior.

So then - we are yet very far from the solution of our basic problem - the psychological and neurological organization of the man's conscious action, - and coming to the end of this presentation we can only look forward - with envy and hope - to the work of further generation of psychologists who will once take place on this tribune and draw to the end the observations the over generation has only started

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